Теория экономических механизмов

: Литература по курсу
Опубликован: 05.08.2011 | Доступ: свободный | Студентов: 1543 / 82 | Оценка: 4.50 / 3.50 | Длительность: 18:52:00
ISBN: 978-5-9963-0014-3
Специальности: Математик, Экономист
  • 1.
    Aggarwal G., Goel A., Motwani R
    Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
  • 2.
    Anand P
    Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk
  • 3.
    Arrow K. J
    Social Choice and Individual Values
  • 4.
    Arrow K. J
    Aspects of the Theory of Risk-Bearing
  • 5.
    Arrow K. J
    The Property Rights Doctrine and Demand Revelation under Incomplete Information
  • 6.
    Bajari P., Hortacsu A
    The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions
  • 7.
    Barbera S
    Pivotal Voters. A New Proof of Arrow's Theorem
  • 8.
    A. Raghunathan, B. Mishra, D. Mao, D. Shasha, F. Wang, G. Koren, L. Rosier, S. Baruah
    On the competitiveness of on-line real-time task scheduling
  • 9.
    Ben-Haim Y
    Info-Gap Decision Theory: Decisions Under Severe Uncertainty
  • 10.
    Bishop D. T., Cannings C
    A GeneralizedWar of Attrition
  • 11.
    Bishop D. T., Cannings C., Maynard Smith J
    The War of Attrition with Random Rewards
  • 12.
    Border K. C
    Fixed Point Theorems with Applications to Economics and Game Theory
  • 13.
    Clarke E. H
    Multipart Pricing of Public Goods
  • 14.
    Cournot A. A
    Recherches sur les principes mathematiques de la theorie des richesses
  • 15.
    Dasgupta P., Hammond P., Maskin E
    The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some Results on Incentive Compatibility
  • 16.
    d'Aspremont C., Gerard-Varet L.-A
    Incentives and Incomplete Information
  • 17.
    Edelman B., Ostrovsky M., Schwarz M
    Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
  • 18.
    Ellsberg D
    Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
  • 19.
    Fisher R
    The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection
  • 20.
    Fudenberg D., Tirole J
    Game Theory
  • 21.
    Geanakoplos J
    Three Brief Proofs of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
  • 22.
    Gibbard A
    Manipulation of Voting Schemes: a General Result
  • 23.
    Gibbons R
    A Primer in Game Theory
  • 24.
    Groves T
    Incentives in Teams
  • 25.
    Harris M., Townsend R
    Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information
  • 26.
    Holzman R., Monderer D
    Characterization of Ex-Post Equilibrium in the VCG Combinatorial Auctions
  • 27.
    Houser D., Wooders J
    Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from eBay
  • 28.
    Hurwicz L., K. J. Arrow, P. Suppes, S. Karlin
    Optimality and Informational Eciency in Resource Allocation Processes. Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences
  • 29.
    Hurwicz L
    The design of mechanisms for resource allocation
  • 30.
    Hurwicz L., Reiter S
    Designing economic mechanisms
  • 31.
    Kakutani S
    A generalization of Brouwer's xed point theorem
  • 32.
    Keynes J. M
    A Treatise on Probability
  • 33.
    Klemperer P
    How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions
  • 34.
    Klemperer P
    Auctions: Theory and Practice
  • 35.
    Krishna V
    Auction Theory
  • 36.
    Krishna V., Morgan J
    An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction
  • 37.
    Krishna V., Perry M
    Ecient Mechanism Design: Tech. rep
  • 38.
    Laont J.-J., Maskin E
    A Dierentiable Approach to Expected Utility Maximizing Mechanisms
  • 39.
    Laont J.-J., Maskin E
    Optimal reservation price in the Vickerey auction
  • 40.
    Lavi R., Mu'alem A., Nisan N
    Two Simplied Proofs for Roberts'
  • 41.
    Lee S. C. M., Lui J. C. S., Ma R. T. B., Yau D. K. Y
    An Incentive th Mechanism for P2P Networks
  • 42.
    Makowski L., Mezzetti C
    Bayesian and Weakly Robust First-Best Mechanisms: Characterization
  • 43.
    Maskin E., Riley J
    Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
  • 44.
    Maskin E., Riley J
    Optimal multi-unit auctions
  • 45.
    Maynard Smith J
    Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Contests
  • 46.
    Maynard Smith J
    Evolution and the Theory of Games
  • 47.
    Maynard Smith J., Parker G. A
    The Logic of Asymmetric Contests
  • 48.
    McAfee R. P., McMillan J
    Auctions and Bidding
  • 49.
    McAfee R. P., Reny P
    Correlated Information and Mechanism Design
  • 50.
    Mehta A., Saberi A., Vazirani U., Vazirani V
    AdWords and generalized online matching
  • 51.
    Melody W. H
    Spectrum Auctions and Ecient Resource Allocation: Learning from the 3G Experience in Europe
  • 52.
    Meyer-ter-Vehn M., Moldovanu B
    Ex-post implementation with interdependent valuations
  • 53.
    Milgrom P., Weber R
    A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
  • 54.
    Myerson R
    Incentive-compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
  • 55.
    Myerson R
    Optimal Auction Design
  • 56.
    Myerson R
    Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal-Agent Problems
  • 57.
    Myerson R
    Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive Compatibility: an Introduction
  • 58.
    Myerson R
    Multistage Games with Communication
  • 59.
    Myerson R., Satterthwaite M. A
    Ecient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading
  • 60.
    Nash J
    Equilibrium points in n-person game
  • 61.
    von Neumann J
    Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftspiele
  • 62.
    Morgenstern O, von Neumann J.
    Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
  • 63.
    Nisan N., Ronen A
    Computationally Feasible VCG Mechanisms
  • 64.
    Osborne M. J
    An Introduction to Game Theory
  • 65.
    Osborne M. J., Rubinstein A
    A course in game theory
  • 66.
    Porter R
    Mechanism design for online real-time scheduling
  • 67.
    Pratt J. W
    Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
  • 68.
    Reny P. J
    Arrow's Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: a Unied Approach
  • 69.
    Riley J., Samuelson W
    Optimal Auctions
  • 70.
    Roberson B
    The Colonel Blotto Game
  • 71.
    Roberts K
    The Characterization of Implementable Choice Rules
  • 72.
    Rochet J. C
    A necessary and sucient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context
  • 73.
    Rozenshtrom I
    Dominant strategy implementation with quasi-linear preferences
  • 74.
    Satterthwaite M. A
    Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions
  • 76.
    Vickrey W
    Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders
  • 77.
    Vickrey W
    Auctions and Bidding Games
  • 78.
    Williams S. R
    A characterization of ecient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
  • 79.
    Зенкевич Н.А., Петросян Л.А., Семина Е.А
    Теория игр